William & Mary Law Review
Volume 50 (2008-2009)
Issue 3

Article 7

12-1-2008

I'll Make You a Deal: How Repeat Informants Are Corrupting the
Criminal Justice System and What To Do About It
Emily Jane Dodds

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons

Repository Citation
Emily Jane Dodds, I'll Make You a Deal: How Repeat Informants Are Corrupting the Criminal
Justice System and What To Do About It, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1063 (2008),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol50/iss3/7
Copyright c 2008 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

NOTE

I'LL MAKE YOU A DEAL: HOW REPEAT INFORMANTS ARE
CORRUPTING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
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INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice system prides itself as being based
on fundamental fairness. Although adversarial by nature, the
system includes protections and practices intended to even the
playing field between prosecutor and defendant, including such
constitutional safeguards as the presumption of innocence1 and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The Founders' grave concern with
protecting the accused against abuses by the government can be
seen in the very structure of the Bill of Rights, in which four of the
ten amendments are devoted to guaranteeing the criminally accused
fair process and proceedings. 3 In 1963, the Supreme Court pronounced another constitutional tenet designed to equalize opportunity between prosecutor and defendant. In the landmark case of
Brady v. Maryland, the Court found that criminal defendants have
a due process right to receive materially exculpatory evidence in the
prosecution's possession.4 In its opinion, the Court ardently invoked
the principles of fairness and justice,' and the Brady Court's
directive seems clear: If the prosecution has evidence that is
material to the defendant's innocence, the prosecution, in the
interest of fairness, must give it to the defendant.
In practice, however, application of the rule has not been easy,
especially as it relates to jailhouse informants. A jailhouse informant is '"an inmate who is either asked by the government to report
any incriminating evidence shared with the inmate by another
1. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) ("'The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law." (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895))).
2. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("'T]he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures);
U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing due process and protecting against double jeopardy and selfincrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to a speedy and public trial, an
impartial jury, confrontation of witnesses, and the assistance of counsel); U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (protecting against excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment).
4. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
5. Id. at 87-88 ("[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused
is treated unfairly.").
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inmate or who comes forward on his or her own with such information,"' usually in exchange for some type of bargain or benefit
from the government.' These benefits range from the more dramatic
sentencing reductions, dismissals of charges, or recommendations
for sentencing leniency, 7 to smaller rewards such as cash or cigarettes.8 The law is settled that if a prosecutor grants such a benefit
in exchange for "helpful" testimony in a given case, the benefit must
be disclosed under Brady as materially exculpatory evidence,
because of the possible negative impact it may have on the informant's motivation to testify truthfully.9 The prosecution, however,
is not under any Brady obligation to disclose whether the informant
has made a habit of proffering evidence against other inmates or
whether the government has given him benefits for his testimony in
the past; that is, prosecutors have no obligation to disclose an
informant's "testimonial history."
Although this type of evidence seems particularly exculpatory
-after all, among the most questionable testimony is that of an
informant who has learned that turning in others means gain for
himself 1° -Brady's progeny and a restricted materiality standard
have hamstrung its discoverability. 1 1 This Note argues that an
informant's testimonial history, because it constitutes impeaching
and potentially exculpatory evidence, should be made a part of
mandatory Brady disclosures through a broadening of the rule's
materiality standard, now focused on a post-conviction-type review
6. Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be Required To Record Their Pretrial
Interviews with Accomplices andSnitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 262 (2005) (quoting Jack
Call, JudicialControl of JailhouseSnitches, 22 JUsT. SYs. J. 73, 73 (2001)).
7. Id. at 262-63.
8. See Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, JailhouseSnitches: TradingLies for Freedom,
L.A. TiMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at 1.
9. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); see also Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959).
10. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 701-02 (2004); see also Call, supranote 6, at
74; Roberts, supra note 6, at 260.
11. See, e.g., Mary Prosser, Reforming CriminalDiscovery: Why Old ObjectionsMust Yield
to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 562-64 (discussing the impact of limited discovery on
the reliability of outcomes in criminal cases); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and
ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEoRGE L. REv. 643, 644, 66162 (2002) (discussing the evolution of Brady's materiality standard and arguing that the
doctrine has developed into a posttrial remedy for prosecutorial misconduct rather than a
pretrial discovery device).
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of the outcome, to one that would reach all exculpatory evidence
tending to negate guilt. Part I outlines the evolution of the Brady
rule and the prosecution's existing obligations with regard to jailhouse informants. Part II addresses the problem of repeat informants and the dangers they pose to the administration of genuine
justice. Part III analyzes the exculpatory and impeachment value of
an informant's testimonial history, and its inclusion under the
current and proposed materiality standards. Part IV examines case
law supporting an expanded materiality standard, its relationship
to jailhouse informant testimony, and recent commentary advocating the same.
Jailhouse informant testimony poses a particular danger to the
original promise of Brady. Ideally, prosecutors would use informant information as a way to gather important testimony against
factually guilty defendants offered by individuals in a unique
position to acquire such information. The introduction of benefits
in exchange for testimony useful to the prosecution corrupts the
process, however, by encouraging those with little to lose to
fabricate damaging testimony in order to reap the government's
rewards. 2 And the more that an informant "cashes in" on the
system, the more doubtful the veracity of that informant's testimony
becomes. 3 Broadening the materiality standard to include all
evidence that tends to place the defendant's guilt into doubt would
certainly promote the mandatory disclosure of the testimonial
history of a repeat informant, by its very nature suspicious. This
measure is vital to ensuring that criminal defendants are afforded
access not only to evidence suggesting their innocence, but also to
the benefits of a fair and just trial lauded in Brady and in the
American criminal justice system.

12. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 691; see also Call, supra note 6, at 74; Roberts, supra note 6,
at 260.
13. See Erik Lillquist, ImprovingAccuracyin CriminalCases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897,922

(2007).
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I. THE BRADY RULE AND THE PROSECUTION'S EXISTING
OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS

A. Evolution of the Brady Rule
The Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland was neither
an unprecedented nor sudden pronouncement. Even before Brady
was decided, the Court had already issued an opinion recognizing
the suspicious nature of jailhouse informant testimony and the
great need for prosecutorial disclosure of information that would
illuminate an informant's potential motivation for testifying." In
1959, the Court in Napue v. Illinois found reversible error in a case
in which a prosecutor permitted his lead witness, a jailhouse
informant, to testify falsely that he had not received any bargains
in exchange for his testimony, when in fact the prosecution had
offered to recommend a reduced sentence. 15
Writing for the Court, then-Chief Justice Warren stated that
"[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given
witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is
upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in
testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." i" At
the time of Napue, the Court seemed acutely aware of the danger
that a jailhouse informant might deliberately craft false testimony
for the very purpose of obtaining the prosecution's good graces.
Therefore, regarding the prosecution's failure to disclose the benefit
conferred on the informant, the Chief Justice wrote that
[h]ad the jury been apprised of the true facts ... it might well

have concluded that [the informant] had fabricated testimony in
order to curry the favor of the very representative of the State
who was prosecuting the case in which [the informant] was
testifying, for [the informant] might have believed that such a
representative was in a position to implement ... any promise of
consideration."
14. See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
15. Id. at 265-67.
16. Id. at 269.
17. Id. at 270.
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Napue thus laid the groundwork for the case of John Brady,
which came before the Court only four years later, in Brady v.
Maryland.1 8 Brady had been convicted of first degree murder, and
while he did not deny that he had participated in the crime, he
maintained throughout his trial that a companion, Boblit, had
performed the actual killing. 9 Before Brady's trial had begun, the
defense requested that the prosecution disclose any evidence documenting Boblit's statements. 20 The prosecution complied with the
request and turned over the information, except for one noteworthy
document in which Boblit admitted that he was the actual killer.2 1
John Brady remained unaware of the existence of the document
until after his conviction and unsuccessful appeal to the Maryland
Court of Appeals."
On certiorari, the Supreme Court famously declared that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution,"2 thus establishing the principle that would henceforth be known as the Brady rule. The Court's fervent statements
supporting the pronouncement suggest that the decision was
fundamentally based on a question of fairness, and the ruling was
fashioned as an unabashed attempt to safeguard justice.2 4 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, declared that "[s]ociety wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly."2 5 He then quoted an inscription on the
walls of the Department of Justice, reading, "The United States
wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts,"26

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing Brady's affirmed conviction in Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434 (Md. 1959)).
Id. at 87.
See id. at 87-88.
Id. at 87.

Id.
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and subtly admonished less scrupulous prosecutors who might be
tempted to conceal exculpatory material.27
But although the moral directive of the Brady rule seems obvious, its practical application is not. The years following Brady
saw the Court simultaneously expand the scope of the Brady rule
and the situations in which it applied, while also refining and
restricting the definition of what constituted "material" evidence.2"
In Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that evidence
bearing on the credibility of a given witness is exculpatory and
requires Brady disclosure, and further stated that "evidence of any
understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution" is relevant
to credibility.2" But in the very same case, the Court stated that not
all evidence that could be useful to the defense is required to be
disclosed, and reaffirmed the requirement of a finding of "materiality."' Here, the Court clarified the meaning of "materiality" by
stating that "[a] new trial is required if 'the false testimony could...
in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury
,,,31

By 1985, however, the Court had abandoned the Giglio "reasonable likelihood" test and, in United States v. Bagley, further
restricted the materiality standard. Bagley redefined evidence as
"material" for Brady purposes "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different," and narrowly defined
a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."3 2
In 1995, the Court once again subjected the Brady rule to an
expand-and-contract holding.3 3 First, the Court broadened the
scope of Brady disclosures by extending a prosecutor's obligation
to disclose material evidence beyond the prosecutor's immediate
sphere, and required the prosecutor to 'learn of any favorable
27. Id. at 87-88 ("A prosecution that withholds evidence... which, if made available, would
tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the
defendant.").
28. See Sundby, supra note 11, at 647.
29. 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
30. Id. at 154.
31. Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
32. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
33. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf."34
At the same time, however, the Court also limited disclosure
obligations by finding that "the Constitution is not violated every
time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that
might prove helpful to the defense."35 Rather, the Court held that a
determination of materiality rested on the question of whether in
the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant "received a
fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence."36
Finally, in Strickler v. Greene, the Court set out the three essential elements of a successful Brady claim: 'The evidence at issue
must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice
must have ensued."3 7 It is under this standard that a prosecutor's
disclosure obligations with respect to jailhouse informants must be
analyzed.
B. Prosecution'sExisting Obligations Under Brady
The Court's precedents leading up to and following Brady have
made clear that prosecutors must disclose benefits or bargains
offered in exchange for a jailhouse informant's testimony.3" Indeed,
according to the Court, the mere fact that an informant testifies
with the expectation of receiving a benefit undermines both the
informant's credibility and confidence in the veracity of his testi-

34. Id. at 437.
35. Id. at 436-37.
36. Id. at 434.
37. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Legal scholarship has criticized the
Court's assertion that a Brady claim can succeed only upon a showing of prejudice stemming
from the withheld evidence, accusing the requirement of creating a backward-looking
perspective and placing an unusual duty on prosecutors to decide before trial whether an
appellate court might deem the suppression of any given piece of favorable evidence to have
caused prejudice after conviction, especially in light of all other evidence presented at trial.
See Sundby, supra note 11, at 654-55; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1610
(2006); Prosser, supra note 11, at 566.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 676, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
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mony.39 Moreover, the Court has stated that there is no difference
between exculpatory and impeaching evidence for Brady purposes,
4°
because both constitute "evidence favorable to an accused" and
either could "make the difference between conviction and acquittal. 4 1
Further supporting this proposition, the Court in Banks v. Dretke
held that an informer's paid informant status was material for
Brady purposes and had to be disclosed. 42 The Court noted that
an informant's status as a paid informant "qualifies as evidence
advantageous to [the defendant]" and agreed with the appellate
court determination that knowledge of paid informant status
"would certainly be favorable to [the defendant] in attacking [the
informant's] testimony. 4 3 Eliciting this type of testimony would,
of course, bear directly on the informant's credibility. The prosecution's Brady obligations with respect to a cooperating informant's
testimony, however, go beyond the mere disclosure of any deals,
promises, or inducements offered in exchange for testimony.
Prosecutors are also required to disclose prior inconsistent statements made by the informant, 44 the informant's prior criminal
convictions,4 5 and any exculpatory information known by other
4'
agencies working on the government's behalf.
Despite the Court's recognition of the suspect nature of informant
testimony and its consequent holdings granting defendants a due
process right to certain types of informant impeachment information, the Supreme Court's Brady line of cases deals only with the
prosecution's obligations as they relate to benefits or bargains
39. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55; Napue, 360 U.S. at 270.
40. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
41. Id.; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433.
42. 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). Although this case dealt with paid informants, as opposed
to jailhouse informants, it is the fact of compensation-for-testimony that is important. As this
element remains the same for either paid informants or jailhouse informants, the risks and
restrictions placed on one translate to the other as well, and the Court's holding can be
applied equally-and easily-to both.
43. Id. (quoting Banks v. Cockrell, No. 01-40058,2002 WL 31016679, at *12 (5th Cir. Aug.
20, 2002)).
44. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 444-45; see also Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Roulette:
Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 33, 47 (2004).
45. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.
46. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438; United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502-03 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
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offered for the informant's testimony in the case at bar. Stated
differently, none of these cases address whether the prosecution
should be required to disclose to the defense not only any benefits
or bargains extended in the instant case, but also the informant's
entire testimonial history.
The absence of such a holding is striking, as evidence that an
informant has proffered testimony in multiple cases, and perhaps
has even received multiple benefits, ought to be given utmost
importance. Indeed, this January, the Supreme Court will examine
the aftermath of one case, that of Thomas Lee Goldstein, in which
an informant was permitted to conceal both his testimonial history
and the benefits that he was receiving for his testimony in the
instant case.4 7 In 1980, Goldstein was convicted of murder after
Edward Floyd Fink, a jailhouse informant, testified that Goldstein
had confessed to him while in jail.48 Fink also testified that he was
not receiving benefits for his testimony and had never received
benefits for testifying in the past.49 In fact, Fink was receiving
benefits for his testimony, and was a habitual informant who had
received "multiple reduced sentences" in return for testimony in
other cases.5" Although some in the district attorney's office knew
that Fink was being offered benefits to testify against Goldstein,
the attorneys prosecuting the case were never told.5 1 As a result,
"evidence that could have been used to impeach Fink
was not
shared with Goldstein's defense counsel, in violation of Brady v.
52
Maryland."
After his release from prison in 2004, Goldstein sued the district
attorney, alleging that his failure to develop regulations regarding
"promises made to informants in exchange for testimony" violated
Goldstein's constitutional rights and rendered the district attorney
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 53 The district court agreed that the
47. Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1872 (2008).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1171-72 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 1172. Section 1983 allows a citizen to bring a civil action against a judicial
officer whose conduct violated the citizen's civil rights, if the judicial officer's conduct was
taken outside of his official capacity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). In this case, Goldstein alleged
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district attorney's conduct in failing to establish a system of information sharing was administrative conduct rather than prosecutorial, and therefore found that he was not immune from Goldstein's
suit.54 The Ninth Circuit affirmed,5" and the Supreme Court now
stands poised to determine whether a district attorney is immune
from suit under § 1983 for failure to ensure that his subordinates
were made aware of all facts necessary to comply with their
constitutional duties.5 6
Although the Supreme Court will certainly take a hard look at
both Brady and Giglio, the case is not likely to address directly the
issue of whether Fink's testimonial history and past benefits should
have been disclosed to the defense along with the required disclosures regarding benefits offered for his instant testimony. Nonetheless, the case is a stark reminder of the ability of repeat informants
to subvert entirely the judicial process, especially when government
officials and informants alike take a "don't ask, don't tell" approach
to the informant's questionable past.

II. THE TROUBLE WITH JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
A. Prevalenceof Repeat Players
The lack of a Supreme Court holding regarding informant
testimonial histories certainly is not due to a lack of necessity.
Perhaps the most dramatic-and well-known-story of a repeat
informant is that of Leslie Vernon White. In 1988, White, then an
inmate in Los Angeles County, was given a telephone and the
57
surname of an inmate he had never met. Despite the fact that
White did not know the inmate or the charges against him, he
maintained that he could nonetheless gather enough information
about the inmate to fabricate a credible confession that he could
that the district attorney's failure to establish a system of information sharing was
administrative conduct (outside his official capacity), rather than prosecutorial conduct
(within his official capacity). Goldstein, 481 F.3d at 1172.
54. Goldstein, 481 F.3d at 1172.
55. Id. at 1171.
56. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 128 S. Ct. 1872 (2008).
57. Ted Rohrlich, Review of Murder Cases Is Ordered: Jail-HouseInformant Casts Doubt
on Convictions Based on Confessions, LA. TiMES, Oct. 29, 1988, at 1.
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then use to bargain with the government.5" Using only the telephone, White was able to dupe various members of the police and
prosecution into disclosing confidential information about the
inmate, victim, and crime, and further arranged a "meeting" with
the inmate, in order to create the appearance of an opportunity for
the inmate to "confess" to him.5 9 The ease with which White was
able to fabricate another inmate's confession understandably
alarmed the legal community." But perhaps the most alarming part
of White's story is not his demonstration, but his history. At the
time he fabricated the inmate's confession, White had already
testified or offered to testify in more than a dozen cases, receiving
in return money, furloughs, and a letter recommending parole.6" In
1986 alone, White testified in six homicide cases." After the story
of the fabricated confession broke, White claimed to have lied in a
number of criminal cases.63
In the spring following White's fabricated confession demonstration, the Los Angeles Times undertook a three-month study of the
"world of jailhouse informants"6 4 and concluded that informants
engage in "relentless campaigns to implicate their fellow prisoners
in crimes" in order to receive favors from authorities.6 5 Informants
went to great lengths to obtain information with which to barter,
58. Id.
59. Id. The Los Angeles Times article recounts how White was able to obtain enough
information to fabricate the confession. According to the article, variously posing as a
bondsman, deputy district attorney, sheriff's sergeant assigned to the jail, and police sergeant
with informants of his own, White extracted the inmate's personal information piecemeal from
the jail's own booking center (where he learned the inmate's first name, booking number,
charge, and other perfunctory information), the district attorney's office (where he learned the
name of the attorney prosecuting the case and the date of the offense), the sheriff's homicide
squad (where he learned the victim's name), and the prosecuting attorney (where he learned
details of the crime). Id. Also aware that he could not claim to have heard a confession from
an inmate he had never met, White placed a call posing as a district attorney and arranged
to have himself and the inmate transferred to the courthouse and held in the same holding
cell so that the "district attorney" could interview them. Id.
60. Call, supra note 6, at 74; Lillquist, supra note 13, at 922; Stephen S. Trott, Words of
Warningfor ProsecutorsUsing Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996).
61. Robert Reinhold, CaliforniaShaken Over an Informer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1989, at
Al; see also Rohrlich & Stewart, supra note 8, at 1 ("[White] repeatedly had been released
from jail for reporting murder confessions.").
62. Rohrlich, supra note 57, at 1.
63. Reinhold, supranote 61, at Al.
64. Rohrlich & Stewart, supra note 8, at 1.
65. Id.
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including maintaining files of magazine clippings regarding cases,
stealing legal documents from other inmates' cells, posing as jailhouse lawyers, twisting an inmate's explanation of his presence in
jail into a confession, and even purchasing information from other
informants for candy, cigarettes, or money.66 Although reduced
sentences were the "most dramatic" rewards sought from the government, informants also bargained for smaller benefits, including
cash, "creature comforts," and participation in undercover police
operations. 7
Leslie Vernon White and the other Los Angeles inmates are not
alone in their use of information to obtain benefits. According to the
United States Federal Sentencing Commission, in 2003, 15.9
percent of all offenders received a sentencing reduction for "substantial assistance" to the government. By 2006, the percentage had
fallen to 14.4 percent of all offenders, but nonetheless, this figure
still indicates that one in every seven offenders in the United States
receives preferential sentencing for helping the government. 9 This
figure also represents only those offenders who received sentencing
reductions in exchange for their testimony. It does not include
offenders who may have received other benefits, such as furloughs,
cigarettes, or cash payments.
The dangerous and damaging effects that jailhouse informants
wreak on the justice system are further documented by those
committed to righting informants' (and other justice system)
wrongs. The Innocence Project reports that in more than 15 percent
of all wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA evidence, a
police or jailhouse informant testified against the defendant.7
Furthermore, in these cases, "statements from people with incentives to testify-particularly incentives that are not disclosed to the
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.G (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm.
69. Id.; see also George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 50 (2000) (noting that "for a cooperating witness to obtain a
downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines, the government must state in
its motion 'that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense'" (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1987))).
70. Innocence Project, Understand the Causes: Informants/Snitches, http://www.
innocenceproject.orglunderstandlSnitches-Informants.php (last visited July Nov. 20, 2008).
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jury-are the central evidence in convicting an innocent person. 'v
The Innocence Project reports that informants are often incentivized with the same types of offers and rewards that were
discovered in the Los Angeles Times study of jailhouse informants:
7
cash payments, sentencing reductions, and early releasesY.
The
Innocence Project offers numerous stories of victims of jailhouse
informants-wrongly convicted individuals sent to prison on the
"last resort for a desperate inmate. ' 3
More alarming yet, The Center on Wrongful Convictions published a study in 2004 that revealed the disturbing frequency with
which innocent defendants are sentenced not only to prison, but also
to death row. The study describes the cases of thirty-eight men, out
of fifty-one identified, who were convicted of crimes that they did
not commit partly or wholly "on the testimony of witnesses with
incentives to lie,"7 4 many of whom were fellow prisoners and jailhouse informants given prosecutorial "gifts" in exchange for their
testimony. 5
By way of example, one jailhouse informant was offered an eightyear reduction to his fourteen-year sentence if he would agree to
testify against (innocent) defendant Steven Manning.7 6 Following
his testimony, the informant was released to the federal witness
protection program. v Steven Manning was sent to Illinois's death
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id.; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
73. Innocence Project, supra note 70. The stories include that of Ken Wyniemko, who
served eight years after a jailhouse informant was offered the "deal of the century" in
exchange for his testimony. See id. (video recording). Wyniemko was released only after DNA
evidence later proved his innocence. Id. Other cases reported by the Innocence Project include

Larry Peterson, who served more than sixteen years after being convicted on the testimony
of a jailhouse informant with charges pending in three counties, see Innocence Project, Know
the Cases: Larry Peterson, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/148.php (last visited Nov.
20, 2008), and Wilton Dedge, who lost twenty-two years to the testimony of a jailhouse
informant, who, in return, received a drastic cut in his own sentence. See Innocence Project,
Know the Cases: Wilton Dedge, http://www.innocenceproject.orglContent/84.php (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
74. ROB WARDEN, Nw. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH
SYSTEM: How SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO

DEATH ROW 3 (2004-05), availableat http:/www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/
issues/causesandremediessnitches/snitchsystemBooklet.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 8, 10.
77. Id. at 10.
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row, where he spent the next ten years of his life.7" And Steven
Manning is hardly a lone case; the Center on Wrongful Convictions
report lists at least eighteen other men who were sentenced to death
on false informant testimony.7 9 These men lost not only years,
sometimes decades, of freedom-they very nearly lost their lives.
In addition to the stories of defendants harmed by jailhouse
informants, the report also recounts the story of Darryl Moore, a
jailhouse informant himself.' Moore was a known criminal who
made a "pact" with prosecutors, whereby he agreed to provide
testimony in a murder case in return for the prosecution's promise
of cash, dropped drug and weapons charges, and immunization for
a contract murder in which Moore admitted participation. 8 Moore's
own mother testified for the defense, warning the jury that even she
would not believe her son's testimony under oath.8 2 In the end, the
three defendants, an alleged drug kingpin and his associates, were
convicted. After their convictions, Moore recanted his testimony,
explaining that it had been bought by the prosecution, and stating
that he knew nothing of the murder for which the three men had
been convicted.'
Altogether, the Center on Wrongful Convictions reports that 111
death row inmates have been exonerated since the reinstatement of
the death penalty.8" Police and jailhouse informants played a role in
45.9 percent of those exonerations, "mak[ing] snitches the leading

78. Id.

79. Both the roster of informant-convicted inmates and the amount of time they spent on
death row are long: Joseph Amrine, ten years; Dan Bright, eight years; Shabaka Brown,
fourteen years; Albert Ronnie Burrell, thirteen years; Michael Ray Graham Jr., thirteen
years; Earl Patrick Charles, four years; Robert Charles Cruz, fourteen years; Muneer Deeb,
eight years; Charles Irwin Fain, eighteen years; Neil Ferber, five years; Gary Gauger, two
years; Steven Manning, ten years; Juan Roberto Melendez, eighteen years; Adolph Munson,
eleven years; Alfred Rivera, three years; Christopher Spicer, two years; Gordon (Randy)
Steidl, seventeen years; Dennis Williams, sixteen years; Ronald Williamson, sixteen years;
Nicholas Yarris, twenty-two years. Id. at 3-4, 6, 8, 10, 12. Altogether, the men served a total
of 224 years on death row.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The alleged kingpin died of cancer in prison. Id. His associates lost their appeals
and are serving life sentences without parole. Id.
85. Id. at 3.
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cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases."8 As the Center
warns of the American experience with informants and snitches,
"when the criminal justice system offers witnesses incentives to lie,
87
they will."
As alarming as these stories and statistics are, they provide only
half the story. Although it is possible to track how many exonerees
were convicted on informant testimony, it is virtually impossible to
know how many of these informants are repeat players. Neither the
Innocence Project nor the Center on Wrongful Convictions attempts
to discover how many of the identified informants had testified
before, or what they received for it. This is not a failure of either
organization, but rather a failure of the system. Neither prosecutor
nor informant is motivated to reveal the informant's testimonial
history, and neither is required to do so.88
Furthermore, the ability of defense attorneys to discover this
information through conventional methods, such as cross-examination, is extremely restricted. While a defense attorney is permitted
to ask an informant on cross-examination whether he has ever
testified in the past, or was ever offered benefits for doing so, the
attorney is basically out of options if the informant answers "no."89
The attorney is not permitted to argue with or "badger" the
informant into admitting his testimonial history, and may face a
challenge for waste of time or confusion of the issues if he attempts
to do so. 90 By contrast, if a defense attorney was prepared with a
written statement of the informant's history, he would be able not
only to ask the question, but also to impeach a false answer.9 1 As
such evidence is a prototypical example of bias, it would not be
excluded by the evidentiary bar on "extrinsic" evidence.9 2 Yet, as the
law currently stands, the tales of repeat informants and their
destructive testimony are usually discovered only after the mistakes

86. Id.
87. Id. at 2.
88. See discussion supra pp. 1073-74.
89. This is especially so if, as in the case of Thomas Goldstein, the prosecuting attorney
himself has been kept in the dark regarding the informant's testimonial past. See supranotes
47-52 and accompanying text.
90. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
91. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
92. See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note on 2003 amendment.
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have already been made, innocent defendants have already been
jailed, and crooked informants have already been rewarded.
B. ProposedReforms
The danger inherent in the sheer unreliability of jailhouse
informant testimony, combined with the great frequency of its use,
has prompted legal commentators to propose many different types
of reform intended to promote- the credibility of informant testimony. These proposals range from the milder proposition that the
prosecution be required to record its conferences with informants in
order to permit the defense to impeach inconsistent statements
and allow the fact-finder to gauge an informant's credibility, 93 to the
far more radical suggestion that informant misconduct would be
best controlled by creating a "rebuttable presumption that informant conduct is state action ... and action under color of law."94
Somewhere between these two proposals is the suggestion that
judges hold pretrial in camera reviews of the prosecutor's file to
decide which evidence is exculpatory.9 5
Establishing mandatory pretrial "reliability hearings" of any
cooperating witnesses has also been advocated as method of discovering and excluding the testimony of less trustworthy informants.9 6 At these hearings, the court would weigh factors bearing
on an informant's credibility, including cooperation or benefits
received in othercases, and would determine whether the informant
was reliable enough to testify..7 Under this paradigm, an informant's "history of repeated cooperation" would weigh against the
informant and "create a presumption of insufficient reliability."9
93. Roberts, supra note 6, at 298-99.
94. Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vrsion of Informants: A History of Abuses and
Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 89 (1994).
95. Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
ProsecutorialDiscretionand Retrospective Review, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 391, 397-98 (1984).
96. See, e.g., Steven Clark, ProceduralReforms in CapitalCases Applied to Perjury,34 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 453, 460 (2001) (discussing the recommendation of the Illinois House of
Representatives Special Committee on Prosecutorial Misconduct to mandate reliability
hearings for all jailhouse informant testimony, and advocating the same); Harris, supra note
69, at 63-64 (advocating reliability hearings for compensated witness testimony and proposing
guidelines therefor).
97. Harris, supra note 69, at 63.
98. Id. at 63-64.
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Supporters of reliability hearings argue that this method of
judicially prohibiting unreliable government witnesses "would be
an effective step toward stopping perjury... ."" Although this may be
true, such reliability hearings would undoubtedly increase the
burden and expense of the criminal trial, particularly if the
hearings were fully adversarial. Calling the informant to testify,
subjecting him to direct- and cross-examination, calling and
examining other character witnesses, and presenting evidence
bearing on the informant's credibility would significantly encumber
courts. 100 Opponents have further suggested that reliability hearings
may slow proceedings to such an extent that criminal defendants
could be denied their right to a speedy trial. 1 '
In recent years, open file discovery policies, in which the defense
is provided with everything contained in the prosecution's file, have
been advocated as a less burdensome method of preventing Brady
violations.10 2 The Supreme Court, however, has been very clear that
10 3
open file policies fall outside the scope of constitutional mandates,
and at present, whether open file discovery is provided is often left
to the discretion of the individual office or prosecutor. 10 4 Even a
99. Clark, supra note 96, at 460.
100. The strain that reliability hearings would impose on the court is obvious when
considering the sheer scope of information supporters suggest should be presented. One
commentator stated that the court could consider "the informant's criminal history, any
inducement for the informant's testimony, the testimony expected, the circumstances of the
alleged incriminating statements to the informant, whether the informant has ever recanted
the testimony, and other cases in which the informant has testified." Id. Another reliability
hearing proposal included each of these factors, and additionally argued that court should
consider the existence or nonexistence of physical evidence corroborating the informant's
testimony and "anything bearing on the credibility of the compensated witness' testimony."
Harris, supranote 69, at 63.
101. See Clark, supra note 96, at 461 (citing Adrienne Drell, Statement Law Would Slow
System, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at 8).
102. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Too Little Too Late:Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,the Duty
To Investigate and PretrialDiscovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1155
(2004) (noting the "high benefits" of a "prophylactic rule of open file discovery"); Richard A.
Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237,273 (arguing that Brady violations will
be reduced by implementing an open file discovery system in which the entire police file would
be provided to the defense).
103. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("We have never held that the
Constitution demands an open file policy.").
104. See Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush. A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 342 n.170 (2005); Prosser, supra note 11, at 593-94.
Underscoring this assessment, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual states that while prosecutors must
disclose all appropriate Gigio and Brady material, "neither the Constitution nor [the U.S.
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mandatory and uniform system of open file discovery, however,
would not be sufficient to cure the problem of nondisclosure of
jailhouse informant testimonial histories. Because open file policies,
by definition, require disclosure of only that which is in the file, and
because the testimonial histories of jailhouse informants are not
likely to be included in the file, the defense will still be denied this
valuable information.
An examination of two states that have mandated open file
discovery illustrates this deficiency. North Carolina's open file
discovery statute requires the prosecution to provide the oral and
written statements of the defendant, codefendant, and any witnesses, the investigating officers' notes, the results of tests and
examinations, a written list of the names of witnesses expected 1to
05
testify, and other evidence obtained during the investigation.
Florida imposes similar discovery obligations, but further requires
disclosure of tangible papers and documents, whether the state has
been provided information by an informant (but not the informant's
10 6
history), and whether there has been electronic surveillance.
Under these guidelines, unless the jailhouse informant has
announced his testimonial history in either a written or oral
statement, it is unlikely to be found in the prosecutor's official file.
Because of the prohibitory burden imposed by reliability hearings
and the 'loophole" created by open file policies, another method
must be devised for ensuring that the fact-finder is able to judge
fully the credibility of informants who have repeatedly proffered
testimony and gained a benefit in return. This objective could
easily-and cheaply-be realized through an expansion of the Brady
materiality requirement to include all evidence that is reasonably
considered favorable to the defendant. Under this definition of
materiality, an informant's testimonial history would satisfy the
Brady requirement that evidence that is impeaching and "material"
Attorneys' Manual] ... creates a general discovery right for trial preparation .... U.S.
ArroRNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-5.001(B) (2006), availableat http//www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading.room/usamltitle9/5mcrm.htm.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (West 2007).
106. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 (2007). The Florida rule also mandates disclosure of "any
material information within the state's possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of
the defendant." Id. This requirement, however, simply begs the same question of whether an
informant's testimonial history constitutes "material" information. See discussion infra Part
III.B.
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be disclosed and available for use by the defendant in making his
defense.
III. INFORMANT TESTIMONIAL HISTORIES AND THE BRADY
ELEMENTS

A. Exculpatory or ImpeachingInformation
An informant's testimonial history undoubtedly meets the first
element of a successful Brady claim-that "the evidence at issue
must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or
because it is impeaching."1 °7 Multiple Supreme Court, federal, and
state cases have acknowledged the dubious nature of compensated
informant testimony and require the prosecution to disclose the
compensation to the defense. In every case, courts stressed that the
testimony of a compensated jailhouse informant is inherently
suspect, simply by the fact that when a benefit is given in exchange
for "helpful" testimony, it creates in the informant a strong incentive to lie.0 8
Legal commentators too have recognized that the practice of
predicating rewards on useful testimony, rather than on truthful
testimony, has the effect of encouraging fabrication. Because
defendants know their "only possibility of making a deal with the
government ... is a proffer of testimony helpful in convicting another
defendant," the proffers and ultimate testimony of cooperating
witnesses are "necessarily skewed."'0 9 Moreover, "[w]itnesses who
...
testify on behalf of the government against criminal defendants
in exchange for some form of favorable treatment have enormous

107. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
108. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (stating that it was "beyond genuine debate"
that the informant's paid status "qualifie[d] as evidence advantageous" to the defendant);
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153
(1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269-70 (1959); Ruetter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578,581 (8th
Cir. 1989); Schofield v. Palmer, 621 S.E.2d 726, 731 (Ga. 2005) ("The habeas court concluded
that the State must have believed that [the informant's] evidence was important because it
paid $500 for it, and that the State must also have believed that knowledge of the payment
would have affected its case against [the defendant] because it went to such great lengths to
conceal it."); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
109. Harris, supra note 69, at 50.
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incentives to testify falsely in order to obtain leniency."'1 1 This
motivation to concoct incriminating statements is precisely the type
of impeachment evidence that Brady requires to be disclosed.
Indeed, the American College of Trial Lawyers describes evidence
of favorable treatment and promises of immunity to government
witnesses as "not only favorable, but essential, to the defense in a
criminal trial." '' All of these cases and commentaries therefore
support the notion that any single benefit granted an informer in
any individual case must be disclosed under Brady because it
constitutes impeachable evidence.
But this notion takes on even greater significance in the case of
a repeat informer, for if a benefits-for-testimony bargain implicates
credibility the first time it occurs, suspicion over an informant's
veracity must be exponentially greater after the second, third, or
fourth time the informant proffers information for a price.112
Professor Erik Lillquist notes that "the most doubt-inducing
informants are those who have repeatedly been the recipients of
confessions by other inmates.""' 3 He further states that the more
frequently a jailhouse informant is "confessed to," the more
"completely implausible" it becomes that the confessions are true." 4
more likely that the informant is doing someRather, "[i]t is ...
thing to help create those confessions.""' 5 The American College
of Trial Lawyers also recognizes "prior perjury or false testimony
of government witnesses" as evidence "essential" to the defendant's
110. Roberts, supra note 6, at 260; see also Call, supra note 6, at 74 ("Because jailhouse
informants are already incarcerated, they are likely to feel they have nothing to lose and
much to gain by providing information to the government. The problem is that they have so
little to lose and so much to gain that there is considerable incentive for them to lie.").
Perhaps the starkest commentary on informants' predilection for fabricating testimony
comes from Judge Stephen S. Trott, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in a cautionary guide for prosecutors using criminals as witnesses:
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims another
prisoner has confessed to him. The snitch now stands ready to testify in return
for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes these snitches tell the truth,
but more often they invent testimony and stray details out of the air.
Trott, supra note 60, at 1394.
111. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codificationof Disclosureof FavorableEvidence
Under FederalRules of CriminalProcedure11 and 16,41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 102-03 (2004).
112. Lillquist, supra note 13, at 922.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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ability to make his defense, but notes that Brady disclosures are not
always sufficient to uncover this type of information."' And in a
2002 report by the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment
in Illinois, the Commission unanimously recommended that in cases
using informant testimony, "the state should promptly inform the
defense as to the identification and background of the witness,"
noting that such information is necessary for proper cross-examination." 7
One can clearly understand how evidence that an informant has
"snitched" time after time might affect a jury. If an informant comes
forward once with a proffer of testimony-perhaps truthful, perhaps
not-and receives a reward for his "helpfulness," it is easy to
imagine that the informant would be interested in being "helpful"
again in the future, so that he might receive another reward. The
problem of credibility results because jailhouse informants are not
typically conscientious individuals who are reluctant to betray their
comrades. Rather, jailhouse informants are usually thought of as
being out for themselves and likely to be far more interested in
rewards than truth."' The proclivity of informants to hand over
their possibly innocent associates for personal gain has been a
frequent topic of commentary."' The general reputation of informants is neatly, if understatedly, summarized in an article focused
on the danger of untruthful jailhouse testimony: "[T]he past
behavior of most jailhouse informants does not inspire confidence
that they are trustworthy."'2 ° Thus, a jury's affirmative knowledge
that an informant (a) received a bargain for his proffer of testimony
116. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 102-03.
117. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 134 (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/complete- report.pdf.
118. See discussion supraPart II.A.
119. See Trott, supra note 60, at 1383 ("Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything
to get what they want, especially when what they want is to get out of trouble with the law.
This willingness to do anything includes ...lying, committing perjury, manufacturing
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double-crossing anyone
with whom they come into contact .... "); Steven D. Clymer, Undercover Operatives and
Recorded Conversations:A Response to ProfessorsShuy and Liniger,92 CORNELL L. REv. 847,
848 (2007) (book review) ("At best, undercover informants are willing to betray factually guilty
friends, co-workers, and associates for personal gain. At worst, they are willing to do so to
those whom they know to be innocent.").
120. Call, supra note 6, at 80.
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in the instant case, and (b) has received bargains for proffers of
testimony in past cases, combined with the jury's inherent understanding that (c) jailhouse informants will lie to get what they want,
and (d) it is doubtful than any single jailhouse informant will
continually be the recipient of honest confessions, could easily
the "reasonable doubt" that results in a verdict of not
establish
12 1
guilty.
B. That Is Material to Guilt or Innocence
Even though an informant's testimonial history meets the first
Strickler requirement of being favorable to the defendant because
it is impeaching,'2 2 it must also meet the second element of the
order to
Brady standard-that is, it must be "material"-in
23
constitute admissible evidence under Brady.
1. Inadequacy of the CurrentDefinition of Material
Legal scholarship has frequently criticized the Brady materiality
standard as inadequate to ensure that the defendant receives all the
exculpatory material that is of practical use to his defense.'24 These
inadequacies go directly to the problem of nondisclosure of informant testimonial histories. Commentators charge Brady's holding
and subsequent development in the Supreme Court with transforming the original doctrine into a "post trial remedy for prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct" rather than a pretrial
assurance of discovery of favorable evidence. 2 5 More specifically, the
Court's narrowing of the materiality standard is accused of being
primarily responsible for the diminished value of Brady as a pretrial
121. See id. Interestingly, the government in the Eighth Circuit case Ruetter v. Solem
argued that because the informant is a convicted felon, his credibility is already in question
and the jury's doubt does not need to be supplemented by evidence that he received benefits
for his testimony. Ruetter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 1989). The court rejected this
argument, relying on the Supreme Court's language in Napue that the '"fact that the jury was
may have had an interest in
apprised of other grounds for believing that the witness ...
testifying against petitioner [does not turn] what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair

one." Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959) (omission in original)).
122. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see discussion supra Part III.A.
123. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
125. See Sundby, supra note 11, at 644.
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discovery rule.'2 6 The limited discovery required by the restricted
materiality standard can force a defendant to build a case without
the tools that would adequately permit his counsel to investigate his
true level of culpability. 127 One of these tools is, of course, the
credibility of any jailhouse informants who claim to have incrimi128
nating information regarding the defendant.
Some commentators argue that the language in Brady does not
necessarily mandate the Court's narrow "reasonable probability"
standard for obligatory disclosure. 29 Rather, a "perfectly plausible
reading of 'material' within the context of the opinion is that it
means 'relevant' ... ,o Thus, were the Court to adopt a broader
materiality standard that focused on an affirmative duty to turn
over all "relevant favorable evidence," the Court would thereby
create a forward-looking rule that would reestablish Brady's pretrial
significance."' Certainly, under this model, the testimonial history
of a repeat informant would qualify as "relevant favorable evidence."
Indeed, others note that current standards prevent the defense from
receiving disclosure about many aspects of informant testimony,
and have proposed regulations to help make access to pertinent
information more "neutral" and accessible. 1 2 These proposals also
further the general legal preference that the jury should hear any
evidence relating to questionable reliability so that the fact-findernot the prosecutor-is charged with the task of determining
33
whether evidence should be believed.
Frequently, prosecutors are vilified as being generally unconcerned with their obligations to disclosure-and to justice--due to
common failures to turn over obviously exculpatory material."4
126. See id. at 644-45; see also Prosser, supra note 11, at 569.
127. Prosser, supra note 11, at 549-50, 563. "
128. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 102-03.
129. See Sundby, supra note 11, at 661-62.
130. Id. at 646.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 69, at 61; Prosser, supra note 11, at 598, 604.
133. See Call, supra note 6, at 75.
134. Burke, supranote 37, at 1590 ("Prosecutors choose to overcharge defendants, withhold
exculpatory evidence, and turn a blind eye to claims of innocence; therefore, the traditional
inference goes, they must value obtaining and maintaining convictions over 'doing justice."');
Capra, supranote 95, at 394-95 ("Evidence that defense counsel might consider very favorable
(or that can lead to even more favorable evidence) is apt to be downplayed or overlooked-and
thus not disclosed--by an advocate on the other side."); Prosser, supra note 11, at 567-68
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Prosecutors are charged with generally ignoring informant backgrounds and "continu[ing] to prosecute defendants despite having
an informant's status or background was not
information that ...
properly disclosed."' 5 However, Alafair Burke argues that such
failures do not result from a conscious plan on the part of the
prosecutor to undermine justice, but rather that prosecutors are
susceptible to certain "cognitive bias[es]" that lead them truly to
believe in a defendant's guilt-and therefore overzealously pursue
3 Because of these
conviction--despite evidence to the contrary.
biases, prosecutors are apt to overestimate the strength of their own
case and underestimate the potential exculpatory value of other
probability" that
evidence when asked to evaluate the "reasonable
137
trial.
the
of
outcome
the
affect
will
the evidence
Analyzing the prosecution's nondisclosure of an informant's
testimonial history under this framework, a prosecutor may fail to
reveal an informant's testimonial history not out of a desire for
underhanded or malicious prosecutions, but simply because the
prosecutor does not believe the evidence is sufficiently exculpatory
to require its disclosure. If the prosecutor holds an honest and
earnest belief in the defendant's guilt, seeks to confirm that belief,
and tends to overvalue evidence that supports it while downplaying
evidence that does not, 38 a prosecutor may "rationally" believe that
39
information obtained from an untrustworthy informant is true.'
Consequently, the prosecutor may place great weight on that
information, while simultaneously undervaluingevidence that the
informant may be lying-such as evidence that the informant has
testified in a dubiously large number of cases or has outright lied in
the past.

("Bad faith nondisclosures continue decades after Brady.").
135. Zimmerman, supra note 94, at 98.
136. Burke, supra note 37, at 1593. Burke states that the psychological biases that can
convince a prosecutor of the defendant's culpability independent of the existence of
exculpatory evidence include a tendency to seek to confirm rather than disconfirm an alreadyexisting hypothesis, a tendency to overvalue information that supports preexisting theories
and undervalue evidence that does not, a tendency to continue to adhere to a theory even after
it is disproved, and a tendency to adjust one's beliefs to maintain existing self-perceptions. Id.
at 1593-94.
137. Id. at 1610-12.
138. Id. at 1593-94.
139. Id. at 1611.
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Although Burke's theory casts prosecutorial nondisclosure in a
more sympathetic light, she does not suggest that an understandable prosecutorial decision to withhold evidence is also an
acceptableone. " 0 Rather, Burke argues that "broadening the Brady
standard to include all favorable information" would avoid the
"cognitive disaster" inherent in Brady by producing better prosecutorial decision making.'' In actuality, however, broadening the
materiality standard in this way would not produce "better" prosecutorial decision making; it would merely eliminate the need for
prosecutors to make decisions about what constitutes "materially
exculpatory evidence" at all. Instead, prosecutors would simply
disclose all favorable information-including testimonial histories.
2. ProposedDefinition of Material
The proposal to expand the Brady materiality standard to include
all relevant evidence that tends to exculpate the defendant, rather
than only that that is "reasonably probable" to induce a different
verdict, has found support among courts and commentators alike.
With respect to informant testimonial histories, this expanded
standard would transform nondiscoverable-but impeachingevidence into discoverable evidence. Indeed, Justice Marshall put
forth this proposition early, and emphatically, in his dissent in
United States v. Bagley.'
a. JusticeMarshall's Bagley Dissent
In Brady, the Supreme Court's absolute statements regarding the
importance of "fairness" and "justice" in criminal actions'. suggest
that the Court originally intended the Brady rule to be more than
the perfunctory tribute to integrity in the justice system that the
restricted materiality standard has created.'
Rather, these
statements denote an intent that Brady should further even-handed

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1631-33.
473 U.S. 667, 702 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
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dealing and true judicial impartiality.1 45 By the time of Bagley
twenty-two years later, however, Justice Marshall had become
clearly alarmed at the direction the Court's Brady decisions were
moving, and harshly criticized the Court for its departure from "the
original theory and promise of Brady" through its restrictions on
the materiality standard. 146 He complained that the disclosure
standard permitted prosecutors to avoid revealing "obviously
exculpatory evidence" while staying comfortably within constitutional mandates. 147 In a footnote, Justice Marshall dismissed the
majority's understanding of the Brady materiality standard and
argued instead for an "all relevant evidence" standard, maintaining
that Brady's original statement requiring prosecutors to turn over
evidence "material either to guilt or to punishment" was not
intended to limit disclosure obligations to evidence that is "material"
under the standard the Court articulated in Bagley.148 Rather, he
argued, the Brady Court's reasoning provided "strong evidence" that
the word was used to mean "germane to the points at issue."'149
Justice Marshall repeatedly emphasized the need for a much
broader materiality standard, finding that both Brady and "the
fundamental interest in a fair trial" require the prosecution to
disclose "all information known to the government that might
reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case."'5 ° He
stated that the "existence of any smallpiece of evidence favorable to
the defense" may mean the difference between conviction and
acquittal, that suppression of information that "might reasonablybe
undermines the reliability of the verdict,"
considered favorable ...
and that "important interests are served when potentially favorable
evidence is disclosed.1 51
In addition to his flat rejection of the majority's reasoning behind
a restrictive materiality standard,'5 2 Justice Marshall paid particular attention to the injustice of the prosecution's suppression of

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Sundby, supra note 11, at 643-44.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 700.
Id. at 703 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 693, 695 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 148-51.
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evidence bearing on a witness's credibility.'5 3 Here, he found that
"evidence of that witness's possible bias simply may not
be said to
be irrelevant, or its omission harmless" and nondisclosure of such
"corrupts the process to some degree in all instances."'5 4
Thus, if an
informant's testimonial history is determined to be impeaching, 55
and nondisclosure of impeachment evidence is deemed to be
"corrupting,"'156 it follows that Justice Marshall would
be loathe to
accept a materiality standard-in his view, warped from the Brady
Court's true intent-that permits such relevant and harmful
omissions.
b. In Support of Expanded Materiality
Justice Marshall is not alone in his belief that "material" evidence
encompasses more than simply evidence that creates a "reasonable
probability that ...
the result of the proceeding would have been
different.' 5 7 Indeed, legal commentators have frequently noted that
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
impose more expansive disclosure obligations on the prosecution
than does the Brady materiality standard.'5 8 In fact, ABA Model
Rule 3.8, governing the "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,"
states that
[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall ...
(d) make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing,
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when
the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of the tribunal. 159
153. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 690-91.
155. See discussion supra Part III.A.
156. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 682 (majority opinion).
158. See Burke, supranote 37, at 1628-29; Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual,
2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1592; Sundby, supra note 11, at 651; Roberts, supra note 6, at 268.
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.8 (2007). The exception provided for in Rule
3.8 is explained further in Comment 3. The Comment explains that the exception permits a
prosecutor to seek a protective order from the court if disclosure to the defense "could result
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Because the Model Rule requires disclosure of "all" evidence that
"tends" to exculpate the defendant," 6° it effectively ignores Brady's
requirement that the favorable information have a "substantial
probability" of producing an acquittal.' 6 ' Model Rule 3.8 therefore
recognizes that favorable evidence can be enormously useful to the
defense as exculpatory evidence even without necessarily satisfying
Strickler's post-review materiality standard. 6 2
Although the Model Rule does not use the word "material," its
language embodies what one might expect to see if "materiality"
were understood as Justice Marshall advocated in his Bagley
dissent-that "any small piece" of evidence may be the evidence that
sways the fact-finder toward belief in the defendant's theory of the
case,163 and that Brady's materiality standard was originally
intended to describe evidence "germane to the points at issue.""'
The suspicion and lack of credibility inherent when a compensated
jailhouse informant takes the witness stand has already been
discussed,'65 as has the exponentially greater effect such testimony
might have on the jury if it were apprised of the fact that the
informant is a "repeat player."' 6 Disclosure of the testimonial
history of an informant would "allow[ I defense counsel to use such
information" and "hopefully have the effect of reducing the probative
in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest." MODEL RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.3. Because disclosure to the defendant of information regarding an
informant's testimonial history is unlikely to harm any individuals or the public interest at
large, this exception would not play a role in this type of disclosure.
160. Id. R. 3.8.
161. Burke, supra note 37, at 1629; Green, supra note 158, at 1592; Sundby, supra note 11,
at 651; Roberts, supra note 6, at 268.
162. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
163. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 693 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 703 n.5. Without a doubt, the difference between an ABA/Marshall standard
requiring disclosure of all evidence that "reasonably appears favorable to the defendant," id.
at 699, or "tends to negate [his] guilt," MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.8, and one that
demands a post-conviction showing of "reasonable probability," Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82 (1999), would have been enormously helpful to the Strickler defendant. There, the
Court determined that although the defendant had affirmatively shown that the prosecution
suppressed evidence favorable to his case, his conviction should be affirmed because he had
shown only a reasonable possibility of a different trial outcome instead of a reasonable
probability. Id. at 296. Perhaps, had the Strickler defendant been permitted access to all
evidence that tended to negate his guilt, he would have been able to turn his "reasonable
possibility" of an acquittal into an actual verdict.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 108-15.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
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value of such testimony in the very case in which it is the least
reliable-where the informant has testified before."'6 7
Because this type of evidence has great impeachment value, it
satisfies the criteria established by Justice Marshall and ABA
Model Rule 3.8 for evidence that ought to be disclosed.'68 The fact
that a jailhouse informant purportedly has been the repeated
recipient of damning information about other inmates tends to
suggest that the informant is getting his information through
disreputable means," 9 and therefore tends to negate the guilt of the
defendant, especially in cases in which the informant's testimony
constitutes the bulk of the prosecution's case. 70 In these situations,
the defense would have much to gain by presenting to a jury
evidence that the testimony from the witness on the stand has not
only been bought with benefits in the instant case, but that the
informant has a habit of offering evidence against other inmates so
that he might receive a reward.
Although an informant's testimonial history would surely meet
the "all evidence that tends to exculpate" standard, however, it is
not clear that this type of evidence satisfies the current Strickler
"substantial probability" test. Under the current rules, the process
by which prosecutors decide whose testimony is most useful to their
case is 'largely undiscoverable,"'1' making a successful showing of
prejudice from the standpoint of post-conviction review nearly
impossible.'7 2 This problem is particularly salient to informant
testimonial histories, especially in light of the charge that prosecutors have "simply ignored informant backgrounds" and 'have
continued to prosecute defendants despite having information ...
that an informant's status or background was not properly disclosed."' 73 Similarly, some scholars assert that prosecutors deliberately prefer to keep the details of their bargains with informants
hazy, as juries are less likely to be turned off by a generalized "deal"

167. Lillquist, supra note 13, at 922.
168. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 695-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuCr R. 3.8.
169. Lillquist, supra note 13, at 922.
170. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 69, at 53; Roberts, supra note 6, at 259.
171. Harris, supra note 69, at 53.
172. Id.
173. Zimmerman, supra note 94, at 98.
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than by an "agreement set out a precise discount."' 74 Presumably,
the prosecution would also prefer to keep an informant's testimonial
history quiet for precisely the same reason. Under the current
materiality standard, little prevents the prosecution from withholdfor the very purpose of avoiding its influential
ing this information
175
effect on the jury.
The fact that an informant's testimonial history is not discoverable under the current materiality standard, but would be under
the Model Rule standard, is made even more important by the
observation that "courts do not invoke the disciplinary rule as a
source of additional disclosure obligations, and courts and disciplinary authorities do not sanction prosecutors for failing to
disclose evidence as required by the rule but not by other law."' 76 In
accept the "systematic use of informants"
addition, courts generally
177
without question.
Courts' broad reluctance to hold prosecutors to the disclosure
obligations in the Model Rules is particularly perplexing considering
that all states also promulgate their own rules governing prosecutorial disclosure,178 and the rules in forty-seven states and the District
of Columbia parrot the language in Model Rule 3.8 that "all"
evidence that "tends" to negate guilt should be disclosed. 17 Given
the interests of fairness and justice on which the Court so ardently
based its holding in Brady," the impeachability of an informant's
testimonial history,' 8 ' and the ABA and state promotions of an "all
relevant evidence" standard'82 that would require the disclosure of
an informant's testimonial history, broadening the Brady material174. Lillquist, supra note 13, at 922 (quoting Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 95-96 (1995)).
175. At a minimum, the fact that recent commentaries, cases, and proposals have begun
advocating for a requirement of testimonial history disclosure is itself evidence that such

disclosure is not now required. See Call, supra note 6, at 80; Harris, supra note 69, at 61;
Liliquist, supra note 13, at 922; discussion infra Part IV.
176. Green, supra note 158, at 1593.
177. Zimmerman, supra note 94, at 109.
178. Roberts, supra note 6, at 268.
179. American Bar Association: Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, http'//www.abanet.orgtpr/mrpc/alpha states.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
180. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

181. See discussion supra Part IIIA
182. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62, 178-79.
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ity standard to encompass this type of disclosure is a necessary step
toward ensuring that defendants are equipped with information
bearing directly on their innocence. In addition, considering courts'
unwillingness to enforce the state and ABA Model Rules regarding
ethical prosecutorial disclosure, an expansion of the Brady materiality standard would ensure that courts hold prosecutors accountable
for a failure to provide evidence pertinent to defendants' ability to
mount an informed defense. As Justice Marshall stated in his
Bagley dissent, "[T]o require disclosure of all evidence that might
reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant would have the
precautionary effect of assuring that no information of potential
consequence is mistakenly overlooked."1 83
c. Proposal by the American College of Trial Lawyers
The American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL), addressing the
deficiency of adequate discovery obligations in the federal requirements, has proposed an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16, l' which would clarify the nature of exculpatory
evidence and expand the scope of its required disclosure, thereby
ensuring "that defendants receive the full and consistently applied
benefit of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Brady and its
progeny."'8 5 The ACTL proposal maintains that the current Rule 16
fails to provide defendants favorable information that is material to
either guilt or innocence, and stresses the "critical language" in
Brady that disclosure is required of evidence that "tends to exculpate or reduce one's penalty."'86
ACTL's proposal to amend Rule 16 would remedy this deficiency
in the current rule by requiring the prosecution to disclose all

183. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 698 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs discovery in federal cases. The rule
requires disclosure of the defendant's oral, written, or recorded statements, FED. R. CRIM.P.
16(a)(1)(A)-(B), the defendant's prior record, FED. R. CalM. P. 16(a)(1)(D), documents, data,
objects, and like materials that are material to preparing the defense or that the government
intends to use at trial, FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(1)(E), reports of physical or mental
examinations, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F), and a summary of expert testimony, FED. R. CalM.
P. 16(a)(1)(G); see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 101-02.
185. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supranote 111, at 95.
186. Id. at 103-04 (emphasis in original).
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information reasonably favorable to the defendant.18' The proposal
further defines favorable information as "all information in any
form, whether or not admissible, that tends to: a) exculpate the
defendant; b) adversely impact the credibility of government witnesses or evidence; c) mitigate the offense; or d) mitigate punishment."'" The admissibility of an informant's testimonial history
under this standard hardly could be denied. Because the evidence
could adversely impact the credibility of the informant-a government witness-the prosecution would be obligated to disclose his
history to the defense. That the amendment would have this result
is noteworthy, because ACTL's proposed commentary to the
amendment states that the amendment is intended to codify Brady
v. Maryland and its subsequent line of cases,' 89 thus implying a
belief that disclosure of this type of impeachment evidence should
already be required through the Brady standard.
Of greatest significance to ACTL's proposed codification of Brady,
however, is the drafters' apparent belief that the materiality standard articulated in Strickler is unnecessary under Brady for pretrial
disclosures, and that the definition of "[i] nformation favorable to the
defendant" is sufficient to guide the prosecution.'9 ° ACTL's discussion of the definition of "favorable evidence" states that part (b) of
ACTL's definition 9 ' is intended to "make[] clear that Giglio or
be produced."' 92 However, there is
impeachment material must ...
little in Giglio to suggest that the case left this requirement
ambiguous and in need of such clarification.' 93 Even if it had, the
subsequent Bagley and Kyles cases both unequivocally stated that
impeachment material must be disclosed just as exculpatory
material must be.' 94 But this is not to imply that the ACTL definition of favorable evidence would be merely redundant or would have
187. Id. at 95.
188. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 111-12.
190. Id. at 114. The proposed comments to the amendment further state that a Stricklertype materiality standard is appropriate only for appellate review, but "cannot realistically
be applied by a trial court facing a pre-trial discovery request." Id.
191. Favorable evidence includes information that tends to adversely impact the credibility
of government witnesses or evidence. Id. at 111.
192. Id. at 115.
193. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
194. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676
(1985).
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no effect. What the ACTL proposal does do--and what Giglio,
Bagley, and Kyles did not-is require that all such impeaching
information be disclosed by the prosecution, rather than limiting
disclosure with the imposition of a hindsight-based materiality
standard. As has been discussed, an "all relevant evidence"
standard would permit an informant's testimonial history to be
discoverable. 9 ' The ACTL proposal would establish this standard
in the federal forum.
In the proposal, ACTL lauds the District of Massachusetts for
addressing "federal prosecutors' indifference to pre-trial discovery
obligations" by promulgating Local Rule 116.2, which both expands
and codifies the prosecutor's disclosure duties. 9 6 Substantively, the
Massachusetts Local Rule contains many of the core elements of
Justice Marshall's Bagley dissent and Model Rule 3.8. In defining
exculpatory information, the Massachusetts rule states that
exculpatory information includes "all information that is material
and favorable to the accused because it tends to" place into question
the defendant's guilt, the admissibility or credibility of the government's evidence, or the degree of the defendant's culpability.'9 7 The
most important feature of this definition, however, is the simple fact
that the Massachusetts rule states that the evidence is material
because it tends to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt in some way'98
and thereby implicitly rejects the Bagley standard that evidence is
material only when it has a reasonable probability of changing the
verdict.'
For criminal defendants, the difference between the
Massachusettts rule and the Bagley rule means the difference
between the discoverability of an informant's testimonial history
and its nondiscoverability. Indeed, the District of Massachusetts
appears to recognize and embrace the broader discovery obligations
that its rule imposes on prosecutors with respect to witnesses such
as jailhouse informants. The rule requires that within twenty-eight
days of arraignment the defendant be provided with information
195. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.a-b.
196. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supranote 111, at 104-05.
197. D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2(A) (2001); cf. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693, 695-96 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007).
198. D. MASS. LOCALR. 116.2(A).
199. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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regarding any benefits given to informants and any criminal cases
pending against them.2" It also requires that no later than three
weeks before trial, the prosecution must provide "[a]ny information
that tends to cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any witness
20 1
whom ... the government anticipates calling... in its case-in-chief.
Because an informant's testimonial history is highly impeachable
and most certainly "casts doubt" on the informant's credibility, the
Massachusetts rule-like Marshall's Bagley dissent and ABA Model
Rule 3.8-would require its disclosure to the defense. 2
IV. PRECEDENT SUPPORTING AN "ALL RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
STANDARD

Support for a broader materiality standard has been advocated
not only from a theoretical perspective, but also directly from the
bench. In 1989, the Eighth Circuit rendered an opinion supporting
the notion that evidence that is relevant and favorable to the
accused in defending against present charges must be disclosed,
regardless of whether the evidence arose directly from a deal or
bargain related to the informant's instant testimony.2 3 Specifically,
the court in Ruetter v. Solem found a Brady violation when the
prosecution withheld from the defense information that the state's
key witness, a cooperating co-conspirator, had applied for a sentence
commutation hearing that had been postponed without explanation
until after the co-conspirator testified in the defendant's trial.20 4 The
court stated that this information could "obviously" have been used
at trial to attack the co-conspirator's credibility. 2 5 Of great importance, however, is the fact that the Ruetter court did not find that
the delayed hearing was the product of any deal or bargain between
200. D. MASS. LOCALR. 116.2(B)(1).
201. Id. R. 116.2(B)(2).

202. Massachusetts Local Rule 116.2 has had an impact beyond its immediate jurisdiction.
In 2002, the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment in Illinois unanimously
recommended that Illinois adopt the Massachusetts rule's definition of exculpatory
information. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 117, at 119. Given the
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyer's high praise for the Massachusetts rule, the rule also likely helped
shape ACTL's proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. American
College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 111.
203. See Ruetter v. Solem, 888 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1989).
204. Id. at 581.
205. Id.
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the prosecutor and the informant with respect to the informant's
testimony in the defendant's case.2" 6 In fact, the court explicitly
stated that the district court found no such agreement, and this
finding was not clearly erroneous.20 7 Rather, the court simply held
that the plain fact of the commutation hearing was itself materially
exculpatory because it was impeaching, regardless of the source or
purpose of the benefit to the informant.2 8
This type of finding, which supports the mandated disclosure of
any benefit given to an informant even if it occurred outside the
scope of the instant case, is important to refute the potential
argument that prior testimony or proffers of information should not
be admissible because they are irrelevant to the case at bar, or that
they should fall under an exclusionary evidence rule similar to the
one that prevents "prior bad act" evidence from being admitted.2 9
Regardless, Ruetter's holding that Bradycan compel disclosure even
without an instant agreement between prosecutor and informant
represents a significant step toward obligating the disclosure of
prior testimonial histories.
In 2000, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals2 10 went much
further than Ruetter and fully embraced the "all relevant evidence"
standard as it applies to criminal discovery and jailhouse witnesses.
In Dodd v. State, the defendant was convicted of two counts of
homicide in the deaths of his neighbors.2 1' In addition to other
evidence against the defendant, the State also introduced the
testimony of a jailhouse informant, to whom the defendant had
allegedly confessed the murders.2 12 Prior to trial-but after the preliminary hearing-the informant recanted his testimony regarding
the confession, and then later reasserted its truthfulness.2 1 3 The
206. Id. at 582.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See FED. R. EVID. 404. The analogy to Federal Rule of Evidence 404 would be an
imperfect one in any case, as inadmissible "prior bad act" evidence does not include
impeachment evidence, FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), while evidence of an informant's testimonial
history constitutes nothing but impeachment evidence.
210. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court in Oklahoma with
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases and is the court of last resort in criminal matters. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, http://www.okcca.net (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
211. 993 P.2d 778, 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
212. Id. at 782.
213. Id.
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informant explained the recantation and subsequent reassertion by
saying that "he told the investigator 'what she wanted to hear' in
hope that she would arrange for him to get an [Own Recognizance]
bond."2 14
Reacting to the observation that "most informants relay incriminating statements to the state in expectation of a benefit exchange"
and its concerns about "informant reliability or trustworthiness,"2 1' 5
the Oklahoma court established a comprehensive and broad policy
of disclosure to "apply to all jailhouse informant testimony not
specifically excluded by the United States Constitution. '216 The
court then established six specific disclosure requirements for
jailhouse witnesses, which read in full:
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any deal,
promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made
or may make in the future to the informant ...; (3) the specific
statements made by the defendant and the time, place, and
manner of their disclosure; (4) all other cases in which the
informant testified or offered statements againstan individual
but was not called, whether the statements were admitted in the
case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise,
inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that
testimony or statement; (5) whether at any time the informant
recanted that testimony or statement, and if so, a transcript or
copy of such recantation; and (6) any other information relevant
to the informant's credibility.217
With respect to the disclosure of jailhouse informant testimonial
histories, obligation number (4) is most relevant. The Oklahoma
court fashioned this requirement as broadly as possible, requiring
disclosure not only of past accepted proffers, but also past declined
proffers, and statements that were never introduced at trial as well
as those that were.2 18

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Id. (second emphasis added).
Id.
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In addition to the disclosure requirements, Dodd also mandated
2 19
special jury instructions with respect to informant testimony.
These instructions require the judge in any case in which informant
testimony is permitted to give the jury an instruction warning that
"[t]he testimony of an informer who provides evidence against a
defendant must be examined and weighed by [the jury] with greater
care than the testimony of an ordinary witness," and that when
judging the informant's credibility, the jury should consider "any
other case in which the informant testified or offered statements
against an individual, ... and whether the statements were
admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal,
promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for that testimony or
statement. 22 0
Dodd is particularly notable for its obligation that prosecutors not
only disclose prior instances in which the informant actually gave
testimony, but also those times when the informant wished to give
information, but was refused by the prosecution. Requiring the
prosecution to disclose cases in which an informant was not called
despite his offer to testify is extremely important to fully realizing
the purpose of requiring testimonial histories to be disclosed at
all-that is, to ensure that the defendant is provided with all
relevant information bearing on the credibility of his accusers.
Information that an inmate has repeatedly approached the prosecution with proffers of testimony, even if he was rebuffed, can be
interpreted favorably for the defense. Perhaps the informant is a
known liar, had clearly fabricated the proffered information, or was
simply repeating information already provided in news reports.
Whatever the reason for the rejection of the proffer, the existence of
repeated attempts to bargain almost certainly indicates that the
informant is eager to strike a deal with the prosecution, thus

219. Id.
220. Id. (emphasis added). The Dodd case was actually first heard and decided in 1999, and
the court's holding in that case required not only the broad discovery obligations featured in

the 2000 case, but also would have required a judge to hold a reliability hearing to determine
the credibility of a jailhouse informant before his testimony could be admissible. Call, supra
note 6, at 79. However, a rehearing of the case was granted, and the 2000 decision eliminated
the reliability hearing requirement-though the discovery disclosure obligations remained
intact. Id.
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undermining his credibility and increasing the impeachability of
his testimony.22 '
Since Dodd was decided, some commentators have seized on the
Dodd discovery requirements and have advocated them as the
proper framework within which informant-related discovery should
be constructed.22 2 George Harris states that the government should
be required to disclose information about an informant's credibility
under rules "similar" to the Dodd requirements.22 Although the
disclosure rules advocated by Harris are slightly different from the
Dodd requirements, 2" Harris likewise supports disclosure of "any
information regarding the witness' cooperation in return for
compensation in other cases, whether or not the cooperator was
actually called as a witness in that case."2 25
Similarly, Jack Call also supports Dodd-like discovery requirements, although his proposal differs more meaningfully from the
Dodd requirements with respect to past testimony or proffers of
testimony than does the Harris proposal. Call advocates a set of
disclosure requirements that, in addition to other obligations, would
require the prosecution to disclose "prior testimony given by the
informant as a jailhouse informant" and "any prior recantations by
the informant, in this case or in other cases, with a transcript or
copy of the recantation."22' 6 Although comparable to Dodd, there is
221. Following the Leslie Vernon White scandal, the Los Angeles Times reported on
another, less successful informant, Richard Slawinski. Rohrlich & Stewart, supra note 8, at
1. Slawinski desired to be labeled as an informant, and five times made proffers of testimony
to the prosecution. Id. The first four proffers were rejected, but on the fifth try, Slawinski was
able to convince prosecutors of the veracity of his report that another inmate had confessed
to murder, and prosecutors indicted the inmate based on nothing but Slawinski's testimony.
Id. During the inmate's trial on the charges, the prosecutor determined that Slawinski had
been lying and dismissed the case-but not before Slawinski had received exactly what he
wanted: "snitch status," placement in protective custody, and two releases from jail. Id. By
the time the charges were dismissed against the other inmate, Slawinski had allegedly been
the recipient of yet another murder confession. Id.
222. See, e.g., Call, supra note 6, at 80; Harris, supra note 69, at 63. But see GOVERNOR'S
COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 117, at 133.
223. Harris, supra note 69, at 63.
224. Harris recommends that the prosecution be required to disclose the actual agreement
reached with the informant, any communications related to the agreement, "any information
regarding the witness' cooperation in return for compensation in other cases, whether or not
the cooperator was actually called as a witness in that case," and any other information
pertinent to the credibility of the informant. Id.
225. Id.
226. Call, supra note 6, at 80.
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one notable difference between Call's proposal and Dodd:Call would
require disclosure of an informant's history of cooperation only in
cases in which the informant actually testified,2 7 while Dodd, as has
been discussed, requires not only this information, but also
disclosure of "all other cases in which the informant testified or
22
offered statements against an individual but was not called."
As between these alternatives, the Dodd standard is more
appropriate. An informant who claims to have information and
proffers that information to the government is not more reliable or
credible simply because the government refused his "help" than one
whose proffer is accepted. The very fact that an informant repeatedly wants to bargain bears heavily on the informant's lack of
credibility, regardless of whether a bargain is ever struck with
the prosecution.2 2 9 Despite the minor differences outlined above,
however, the Dodd court, Harris, and Call embody the same
objective of preventing injustice, as put forth in Dodd's concurring
opinion: "[W]e must take certain precautions to ensure a citizen is
not convicted on the testimony of an unreliable professional
jailhouse informant ...
who routinely trades dubious information for
23
0
favors."
CONCLUSION

Jailhouse informants are a notoriously dubious lot. Given an
opportunity for gain, informants are generally understood as willing
to "entrap the innocent, manufacture evidence, lie, commit perjury,
and manipulate law enforcement officials, judges, and jurors. 23 1
Because informant testimony has great potential for falsehood, the
Brady rule mandates disclosure of benefits given to informants in
exchange for such testimony in any individual case.232 More suspect
than informant testimony generally, however, is repeatedinformant
testimony-yet this information remains undiscoverable under
227. Id.
228. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (emphasis added); see supra
text accompanying notes 217-18.
229. See discussion supra pp. 1102-03 & note 221.
230. Dodd, 993 P.2d at 785 (Strubhar, P.J., concurring).
231. Clymer, supra note 119, at 848.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 38-43, 108.
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current Brady standards.23 3 The failure to require disclosure of this
information is puzzling, as knowledge that the witness has made a
in
habit of receiving confessions would no doubt aid the accused
its verdict. 3 4
rendering
in
jury
the
defense-and
his
mounting
Expanding the scope of the materiality standard to include all
evidence that tends to negate the defendant's guilt would not only
permit the defendant access to the testimonial history of those to
whom he has allegedly confessed, but would actually require the
2 35
prosecution to reveal this information ahead of trial. Recognizing
the importance of true prosecutorial neutrality, this standard has
236 proalready been passionately advocated by Justice Marshall,
237 and embraced by
posed by the American College of Trial Lawyers,
23 8
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, fortyseven states and the District of Columbia have likewise adopted the
Model Rule's language that the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense "all evidence ... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused"
in crafting their own rules,2 39 though courts have been reticent in
their enforcement.2 40 Inclusion of informant testimonial histories
under an expanded Brady materiality standard would ensure
judicial enforcement of these rules, as violations of a constitutional
right cannot simply be ignored.2 4 '
Indeed, the tide may be turning for criminal defendants. In 2000,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals became the first court
affirmatively to require disclosure of an informant's complete
testimonial history.2 42 The defendant's ability to make the jury
aware of how frequently the informant testifying against him has
also testified against others-and just exactly what is- in it for
him-will help undercut the probative value of this doubtful
testimony and may even curb the creation of unreliable jailhouse

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
See supra text accompanying note 121.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See discussion supraPart III.B.2.a.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.c.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
American Bar Association: Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 179.
See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
See supra text accompanying note 183.
See supra text accompanying notes 210, 215-18.
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informant testimony in the first place.243 Surely prosecutors,
knowing that the jury will hear the informant's history, will hesitate
to use testimony from the most unreliable of all informants: those
to whom prosecutors have frequently given benefits before.24 4
If the American criminal justice system is to remain a model of
fairness, the government must be required to prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt through the use of competent, reliable, and
trustworthy evidence. If the prosecution does use less reliable
testimony, out of necessity or otherwise, the accused must be given
an opportunity to confront that evidence and reveal its defects.
Nowhere is this truer than in the case of repeated jailhouse
informants, enticed regularly to implicate others with the promise
of rewards. Revealing the motivations and biases of jailhouse
informants through an expanded materiality standard will help to
advance Brady's original promise of due process, fairness, and most
importantly, a truly just trial.
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